Hello John and Doves,
Connecting some dots....
Does Iran already have nuclear
weapons?
Over the years, I have written
several letters on the IAEA's reports on Iran - all of them
tell of being put in blinders, lied too, deceived - cameras
have been removed or shut off, inspectors have been denied
access, specific inspectors have not been allowed in,
certain areas have been 'off limits'. There has been
much deception, much hidden. The IAEA reports have
been marginalized and incomplete on Iran's nuclear
advancement and nuclear capabilities.
Here's my letter on the IAEA's
August 2024 report on Iran's nuclear program:
We've heard for years that Iran was
"6 months away from a bomb", "8 weeks away from a bomb", and
on and on. Years of this. And just recently, 'Iran is
two weeks away from a warhead'. Their centrifuges have
not been idle.
Even the IAEA has said in repeated
reports that Iran was actively and aggressively pursuing a
bomb.
There are 'rumors' that Iran
already has a dozen plus nuclear warheads. Maybe Iran
doesn't 'need to come to the table' because they have
accomplished what they set out to do. Their goal
remains the same. They are Twelvers and they want an
apocalypse to bring back their Mahdi to set up a worldwide
caliphate. They absolutely believe this.
And they have threated to nuke the
capitols of Europe. Are they bluffing??
The IAEA May 31, 2025 Report on Iran:
The most recent IAEA report, May
31, 2025, noted that "One has to conclude that
Iran's real intent is to be prepared to produce large
quantities of WGU (weapons grade uranium, 90%) as quickly
as possible, in as few centrifuges as possible."
Iran can convert its current stock
of 60 percent enriched uranium into 233 kg of WGU in three
weeks at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, enough for 9
nuclear weapons, taken as 25 kg of weapon-grade uranium
(WGU) per weapons.
Iran
can produce its first quantity of 25 kg of WGU in Fordow
in as little as two to three days.
Breaking out in both Fordow and the
Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, the two facilities together
could produce enough WGU for 11 nuclear weapons in the first
month, enough for 15 nuclear weapons by the end of the
second month, 19 by the end of the third month, 21 by the
end of the fourth month, and 22 by the end of the fifth
month.
In front of the inspector's eyes,
Iran is undertaking the near-final step of breaking out, now
converting it's 20 percent stock of enriched uranium into
60 percent enriched uranium at a greatly expanded rate.
The IAEA's efforts to verify Iran's
nuclear activities, particularly its uranium enrichment
activities, continue to be seriously affected by Iran's
decision last fall to withdraw the designation of several
experienced inspectors. The IAEA repeatedly requested
that Iran reconsider this inappropriate, political act,
including in a June 2024 Board of Governors censure
resolution, but Iran has not done so. The IAEA states
in its accompanying report, NPT Safeguards Agreement with
the Islamic Republic of Iran: "The withdrawal of the
designation of several experienced inspectors was also not
in line with the required spirit of cooperation."
As of May 17, 2025, the net overall
enriched uranium stock, including all levels of enrichment
and all chemical forms, had increased by 953.2 kg, from
8294.4 kg to 9247.6 kg (Uranium mass)
As of May 17, 2025, Iran's
stockpile of 60 percent HEU in the form of uranium
hexafluoride was 408.6 kg. This represents a net
increase in the stock in the form of uranium hexaflouride of
133.8 kg since the previous reporting period.''
The IAEA reports that it has
lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the
production and current inventory of centrifuges, rotors
and bellows, heavy water and UOC (uranium ore
concentrate), while it will not be possible to restore.
The IAEA concludes that
Iran's decision to remove all of the Agency's equipment
previously installed in Iran for JCPOA-related
surveillance and monitoring activities has also had
detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to
provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear programme.
Although the IAEA can
ascertain the number of centrifuges deployed at Fordow
and Natanz, it cannot know how many more Iran has made
and stores or deployed at an undeclared site. A
risk that Iran will accumulate a secret stock of
advanced centrifuges, deployable in the future at a
clandestine enrichment plant, which would only need to
house a relatively few advanced centrifuge cascades to
enrich Iran's current stock of 60 percent HEU (highly
enriched uranium, 60%) to WGU (90% enriched). At
the least, this situation complicates any future
verification effort and contributes to uncertainty about
the status of Iran's nuclear activities and facilities.
Combined with Iran's refusal to
resolve outstanding safeguards violations and the program's
unresolved nuclear weapons dimensions, the IAEA has
a significantly reduced ability to monitor Iran's complex
and growing nuclear program. The IAEA's ability to
detect diversion of nuclear materials, equipment and other
capabilities to undeclared facilities remains greatly
diminished.
Fordow
has emerged as a multipurpose facility that can produce
60% enriched uranium then easily produce 90% weapons grade
uranium.
60% enriched uranium possesses a
significant breakout risk, since it is a short step away
from weapons grade uranium. In fact, in terms
of enrichment requirements, 60% enriched uranium is 99% of
the way to 90% weapon grade uranium.
Under a civilian cover, Iran
has thoroughly practiced the main steps of
breakout. It can go directly from 5% to 60%
enrichment.
In December 2024, Iran
dramatically increased their production of 60% enriched
uranium.
Iran has no use or justification for the production of
60% enriched uranium, particularly at the level of
hundreds of kilograms.
It's rush to make much more
of the 60% enriched uranium, quickly depleting its stock
of near 20% enriched uranium, which has a civilian use
in research reactors, raises more questions.
Iran has gone way beyond an excuse
of using 60% as bargaining leverage in nuclear negotiations.
One has to conclude that
Iran's real intent is to be prepared to produce large
quantities of weapons grade uranium as quickly as
possible in as few centrifuges as possible. As
discussed, it can do this now.
Iran's formal 'breakout' time
remains at ZERO. It has enough 60% enriched uranium to
directly fashion 10 nuclear explosives.
Some Closing Thoughts:
In one month, from April to May this year, Iran increased
their 60% enriched uranium by almost 1,000 kg.
And 134 kg more of uranium hexafluoride. Even
the IAEA said Iran was in a BIG hurry to breakout with a
nuclear weapon. According
to the IAEA, one weapon requires 27 kg of weapon grade
uranium.
Did Iran go ahead with the
enrichment and produce weapon grade uranium (WGU)? The
IAEA does not know - but reported that Iran was on the way
to doing this.
It seems reasonable to assume that
Iran made the breakout, anticipating that at some point
Israel and/or the U.S. would do massive attacks on their
nuclear facilities. Israel did a massive attack on
June 15, 2025 and the U.S. hit the 3 nuclear facilities hard
on June 21/22. Iran has had plenty of time to
reach their goal of becoming a nuclear state.
Scott Horton, ex CIA said that
Fordo is 400 meters underground (that's 1200 feet) and its
covered with concrete, granite and steel. The U.S. had
thought about BBBs years ago - actually creating these huge
bombs for Fordow and testing them at White Sands, decided
not to go ahead with bombing it. Too deep. Too
hardened.
Last April 2024, WarNews24/7 (a
site I found to be credible) reported that Russia informed
Netanyahu that Iran had nuclear weapons. According to
the IAEA reports that year, they expected it.
Is it just too scary to think Iran
has been enriching to 90%? They've certainly had the
time and the means. And why would they not?
That's been their goal all along.
Just connecting the dots, I don't
think it's much of a stretch to say Iran is a nuclear state
now.
I think the U.S. and Israel, for
whatever reason, haven't announced this possibility, maybe
because they don't have actual proof of a nuclear weapon,
and they are still saying Iran does not have nuclear
weapons. And that now, the U.S. has destroyed Iran's
ability to make a nuclear bomb. President Trump made a
point of saying Iran didn't have any nuclear weapons.
He absolutely doesn't know this. Is this just wishful
thinking? Not wanting to cause a panic? Does he
think we can't handle that possibility??
Do the Twelvers have nuclear
warheads? They have the ICBMs that can reach the East
Coast. Why would they have those, if they didn't have
the warheads for them? And they probably have tankers
with launchers on them they can move near a coastline.
They can reach the capitols of Europe - they've already
threatened to nuke them.
"Russia's
Security Council said on 21 June that attempts to
dismantle Iran's nuclear program are unlikely to succeed
and could backfire. The council warned that
Tehran might resort to deploying nuclear weapons - if it
possesses such arms - in response to external
threats. The Russian body did not provide evidence
that Iran already has a nuclear arsenal, and Tehran has
consistently denied pursuing
nuclear weapons."
Russia
Warns Iran Could Use Nuclear Arms if Threatened |
DeepNewz Middle East
Was, "if it possesses such arms" a
wink, wink? Knowing every one is still denying
this.
Add that to the WarNews report that
Russia warned Netanyahu in 2024 that Iran has the bomb.
The question then would be:
how many do they have? One would be bad enough - but
if they have dozens....we just don't know.
Are we close to finding out that
Iran is nuclear??
This IS our war. It's the
whole world's war. As Iran moves toward world
dominion, conversion won't be an 'option' - convert or die.
The IAEA report is very
damning. And sobering. We know the U.S. and
Israel have seen this report. They can connect the
dots much better than us. And it doesn't look good, no
matter who is connecting the dots.
Pray for the peace of Jerusalem!
Maranatha!
Chance