This is a complex book. In fact, it reveals a love of complexity by Brzeinski (ZB in subsequent references). He loves the intertwined web of alliances and relationships of government, businesses and organizations, and his theme seems to be, "The more , the better." He's far from being prescient. He does not address the demographic warfare being waged by Islam, nor does he address the demographic disaster transpiring worldwide ... the geriatric world. It must be remembered that he is a CFR intellectual point man.

The book was published in 1998. I do not propose to summarize it here. I've copied some key excerpts regarding the Ukraine, to which he devotes a huge amount of analysis. The fate of the Ukraine is far more significant then we realize. The Ukraine governs the fate of Russia. If the Ukraine becomes a free nation with at least ties to the EU and NATO, Russia will (must) forsake its dreams of former empire and Europeanize. If the Ukraine again becomes the vassal state of Russia, Russia will look eastwards and southwards to rebuild its empire. (He who controls Eurasia controls the world.) 

ZB does not mention the term: New World Order. Nevertheless, in his summary the reader can discern such being formed. (I suggest that the NWO be changed to OWO, One World Order.) The Club of Rome economic zones are clearly recognizable.

David Baye's newsletter states that the Ukraine's gold reserves ... 42 tons worth ... have either vanished or been used up somehow, leaving them little means to wage war. 

The outlook is grim.

THE GRAND CHESSBOARD2

AMERICAN PRIMACY AND ITS GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

ZBIGNIEW 

BRZEZINSKI 

FOR MY STUDENTS - TO HELP THEM SHAPE TOMORROW'S WORLD.

Published 1998

 But the more modern transcon- 

tinental Eurasian bloc lasted very briefly, with the defection by 

Tito's Yugoslavia and the insubordination of Mao's China signaling 

early on the Communist camp's vulnerability to nationalist aspira- 

tions that proved to be stronger than ideological bonds.

In this regard, Ukraine was critical. The growing American incli- 

nation, especially by 1994, to assign a high priority to American- 

Ukrainian relations and to help Ukraine sustain its new national 

freedom was viewed by many in Moscow—even by its "westerniz- 

ers"—as a policy directed at the vital Russian interest in eventu- 

ally bringing Ukraine back into the common fold. That Ukraine will 

eventually somehow be "reintegrated" remains an article of faith 

among many members of the Russian political elite.5 As a result, 

Russia's geopolitical and historical questioning of Ukraine's sepa- 

rate status collided head-on with the American view that an imper- 

ial Russia could not be a democratic Russia. 

Tor example, even Yeltsin's top adviser, Dmitryi Ryurikov, was quoted 

by Interfax (November 20, 1996) as considering Ukraine to be "a temporary 

phenomenon," while Moscow's Obshchaya Gazeta (December 10, 1996) re- 

ported that "in the foreseeable future events in eastern Ukraine may con- 

front Russia with a very difficult problem. Mass manifestations of 

discontent... will be accompanied by appeals to Russia, or even demands, 

to take over the region. Quite a few people in Moscow would be ready to 

support such plans." Western concerns regarding Russian intentions were 

certainly not eased by Russian demands for Crimea and Sevastopol, nor by 

such provocative acts as the deliberate inclusion in late 1996 of Sevastopol 

in Russian public television's nightly weather forecasts lor Russian cities.

The self-definition of Ukrain- 

ian nationhood, during the critical formative stage in the history of 

the new state, was thus diverted from its traditional anti-Polish or 

anti-Romanian orientation and became focused instead on opposi- 

tion to any Russian proposals for a more integrated CIS, for a spe- 

cial Slavic community (with Russia and Belarus), or for a Eurasian 

Union, deciphering them as Russian imperial tactics. 

Ukraine's determination to preserve its independence was en- 

couraged by external support. Although initially the West, espe- 

cially the United States, had been tardy in recognizing the 

geopolitical importance of a separate Ukrainian state, by the mid- 

1990s both America and Germany had become strong backers of 

Kiev's separate identity. In July 1996, the U.S. secretary of defense 

declared, "I cannot overestimate the importance of Ukraine as an 

independent country to the security and stability of all of Europe," 

while in September, the German chancellor—notwithstanding his 

strong support for President Yeltsin—went even further in declar- 

ing that "Ukraine's firm place in Europe can no longer be chal- 

lenged by anyone ... No one will be able any more to dispute 

Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity." American policy 

makers also came to describe the American-Ukrainian relationship 

as "a strategic partnership," deliberately invoking the same phrase 

used to describe the American-Russian relationship. 

Without Ukraine, as already noted, an imperial restoration 

based either on the CIS or on Eurasianism was not a viable option. 

An empire without Ukraine would eventually mean a Russia that 

would become more "Asianized" and more remote from Europe. 

Moreover, Eurasianism was also not especially appealing to the 

newly independent Central Asians, few of whom were eager for a 

new union with Moscow. Uzbekistan became particularly assertive 

in supporting Ukraine's objections to any elevation of the CIS into 

a supranational entity and in opposing the Russian initiatives de- 

signed to enhance the CIS. 

Other CIS states, also wary of Moscow's intentions, tended to 

cluster around Ukraine and Uzbekistan in opposing or evading 

Moscow's pressures for closer political and military integration. 

Moreover, a sense of national consciousness was deepening in al- 

most alt of the new states, a consciousness increasingly focused 

Ukrainian insistence on only limited and largely economic inte- 

on repudiating past submission to Moscow as colonialism and on

gration had the further effect of depriving the notion of a "Slavic 

Union" of any practical meaning. Propagated by some Slavophiles 

and given prominence by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's support, this 

idea automatically became geopolitically meaningless once it was 

repudiated by Ukraine. It left Belarus alone with Russia; and it also 

implied a possible partition of Kazakstan, with its Russian-popu- 

lated northern regions potentially part of such a union. Such an 

option was understandably not reassuring to the new rulers of ' 

Kazakstan and merely intensified the anti-Russian thrust of their 

nationalism, In Belarus, a Slavic Union without Ukraine meant 

nothing less than incorporation into Russia, thereby also igniting 

more volatile feelings of nationalist resentment. 

In early 1996, President Yeltsin replaced his Western-oriented 

foreign minister, Kozyrev, with the more experienced but also or- 

thodox former Communist international specialist Evgenniy Pri- 

makov, whose long-standing interest has been Iran and China. 

Some Russian commentators speculated that Primakov's orienta- 

tion might precipitate an effort to forge a new "antihegemonic" 

coalition, formed around the three powers with the greatest 

geopolitical stake in reducing America's primacy in Eurasia. Some 

of Primakov's initial travel and comments reinforced that impres- 

sion. Moreover, the existing Sino-franian connection in weapons 

forts to increase its access to nuclear energy seemed to provide a 

trade as well as the Russian inclination to cooperate in Iran's ef-

perfect fit for closer political dialogue and eventual alliance. The 

result could, at least theoretically, bring together the world's lead- 

ing Slavic power, the world's most militant Islamic power, and the 

world's most populated and powerful Asian power, thereby creat- 

ing a potent coalition. 

COMMENT: For Russia to look westward to Europe, its only viable

option, the following must be:

Most important in that respect is the need 

for clear and unambiguous acceptance by Russia of Ukraine's sepa- 

rate existence, of its borders, and of its distinctive national identity.

------------------------------------

Most important, however, is Ukraine. As the EU and NATO ex- 

pand, Ukraine will eventually be in the position to choose whether 

it wishes to be part of either organization. It is likely that, in order 

to reinforce its separate status, Ukraine will wish to join both, once 

they border upon it and once its own internal transformation be- 

gins to qualify it for membership. Although that will take time, it is 

not too early for the West—while further enhancing its economic 

and security ties with Kiev—to begin pointing to the decade 

2005-2015 as a reasonable time frame for the initiation of Ukraine's 

progressive inclusion, thereby reducing the risk that the Ukraini- 

ans may fear that Europe's expansion will halt on the Polish- 

Ukrainian border. 

Russia, despite its protestations, is likely to acquiesce in the 

expansion of NATO in 1999 to include several Central European 

countries, because the cultural and social gap between Russia and 

Central Europe has widened so much since the fall of communism. 

By contrast, Russia will find it incomparably harder to acquiesce in 

Ukraine's accession to NATO, for to do so would be to acknowl- 

edge that Ukraine's destiny is no longer organically linked to Rus- 

sia's. Yet if Ukraine is to survive as an independent state, it will 

have to become part of Central Europe rather than Eurasia, and if 

it is to be part of Central Europe, then it will have to partake fully 

of Central Europe's links to NATO and the European Union. Russia's 

to be also truly a part of Europe. Russia's refusal would be tanta- It 

follows that political and economic support for the key newly 

acceptance of these links would then define Russia's own decision

mount to the rejection of Europe in favor of a solitary "Eurasian" 

identity and existence. 

The key point to bear in mind is that Russia cannot be in Eu- 

rope without Ukraine also being in Europe, whereas Ukraine can 

be in Europe without Russia being in Europe. Assuming that Russia 

decides to cast its lot with Europe, it follows that ultimately it is in 

Russia's own interest that Ukraine be included in the expanding 

European structures. Indeed, Ukraine's relationship to Europe 

could be the turning point for Russia itself. But that also means 

that the defining moment for Russia's relationship to Europe is still 

some time off—"defining" in the sense that Ukraine's choice in fa- 

vor of Europe will bring to a head Russia's decision regarding the 

next phase of its history: either to be a part of Europe as well or to 

become a Eurasian outcast, neither truly of Europe nor Asia and 

mired in its "near abroad" conflicts. 

----------------------

COMMENT: The eastward push to the eurasian Balkans

For Ukraine, the central issues are the future character of the 

CIS and freer access to energy sources, which would lessen 

Ukraine's dependence on Russia. In that regard, closer relations 

with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have become im- 

portant to Kiev, with Ukrainian support for the more independent- 

minded states being an extension of Ukraine's efforts to enhance its 

own independence from Moscow. Accordingly, Ukraine has sup- 

ported Georgia's efforts to become the westward route for Azeri oil 

exports. Ukraine has also collaborated with Turkey in order to 

weaken Russian influence in the Black Sea and has supported Turk- 

ish efforts to direct oil flows from Central Asia to Turkish terminals. 

 

independent states is an integral part of a broader strategy for 

Eurasia. The consolidation of a sovereign Ukraine, which in the 

meantime redefines itself as a Central European state and engages 

in closer integration with Central Europe, is a critically important 

component of such a policy, as is the fostering of a closer relation- 

ship with such strategically pivotal states as Azerbaijan and Uzbek- 

istan, in addition to the more generalized effort to open up Central 

Asia (in spite of Russian impediments) to the global economy. 

The benefits of accelerated regional development, funded by 

external investment, would also radiate to the adjoining Russian 

provinces, which tend to be economically underdeveloped. More- 

over, once the region's new ruling elites come to realize that Russia 

acquiesces in the region's integration into the global economy, 

they will become less fearful of the political consequences of close 

economic relations with Russia. In time, a nonimperial Russia 

could thus gain acceptance as the region's preeminent economic 

partner, even though no longer its imperial ruler. 

Miscellaneous note -- Turkey has indeed gone Islam!

Accordingly, America should use its influence in Europe to en- 

courage Turkey's eventual admission to the EU and should make a 

point of treating Turkey as a European state—provided internal 

Turkish politics do not take a dramatic turn in the Islamist direc- 

tion.

In brief, the U.S. policy goal must be unapologetically twofold: 

to perpetuate America's own dominant position for at least a gen- 

eration and preferably longer still; and to create a geopolitical 

framework that can absorb the inevitable shocks and strains of so- 

cial-political change while evolving into the geopolitical core of 

shared responsibility for peaceful global management. A pro- 

longed phase of gradually expanding cooperation with key 

Eurasian partners, both stimulated and arbitrated by America, can 

also help to foster the preconditions for an eventual upgrading of 

the existing and increasingly antiquated UN structures. A new dis- 

tribution of responsibilities and privileges can then take into ac- 

count the changed realities of global power, so drastically different 

from those of 1945. 

These efforts will have the added historical advantage of 

benefiting from the new web of global linkages that is growing 

exponentially outside the more traditional nation-state system. 

That web—woven by multinational corporations, NGOs (non- 

governmental organizations, with many of them transnational in 

character) and scientific communities and reinforced by the In- 

ternet—already creates an informal global system that is inher- 

ently congenial to more institutionalized and inclusive global 

cooperation. 

In the course of the next several decades, a functioning struc- 

ture of global cooperation, based on geopolitical realities, could 

ture of global cooperation, bas

thus emerge and gradually assume the mantle of the world's cur- 

rent "regent," which has for the time being assumed the burden of 

responsibility for world stability and peace. Geostrategic success 

in that cause would represent a fitting legacy of America's role as 

the first, only, and last truly global superpower.