Outgoing Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has once again infuriated
the clerical establishment by accompanying his close
aide, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, to register as a
candidate in the presidential election next month. Not
only is it illegal for a sitting president to endorse a
candidate, but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his
allies have made it abundantly clear they opposed
Mashaei candidacy.
Unsurprisingly,
Mashaei’s registration has prompted immediate and fierce
criticism from many members of the Iranian regime,
particularly those close to Supreme Leader Khamenei. It
has also sparked media reports that he could face “74 lashes” if found guilty
of having violated Iran’s election laws. However, one
point of criticism made by Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, the
head of Iran’s national police force, is particularly
noteworthy.
Earlier this week,
Moghaddam took Ahmadinejad and Mashaei to task for their
constant worship of Shi’a Islam’s Messiah figure,
Muhammad al-Mahdi, the 12th or
Hidden Imam. Specifically the police chief said: “The new
deviant sect [a euphemism used to refer to Ahmadinejad
and his allies] claim that they receive their orders
from Imam of the Age [12th Shia
Imam]. It has been eight years that they are speaking
about this matter but it is not clear who is their
deputy [of the 12 Shia Imam].”
Ahmadinejad’s reverence
of the Hidden Imam is well known and goes at least as
far back as his time as Mayor of Tehran. Many in the West have used Ahmadinejad’s proclaimed belief that
the Messiah’s return is imminent as
evidence that Iran would precipitate a nuclear armed
conflict if it acquires nuclear weapons.
But the fact that the
clerical elite in the Islamic Republic fear
Ahmadinejad’s “Mahdism” underscores what these
commentators overlook; namely, Ahmadinejad’s reverence
of the Messiah figure is primarily (though not
entirely) used for domestic political purposes.
He does this in two ways.
The first is in
bolstering his populist credentials and image as an
ordinary man struggling against powerful and corrupt
regime stalwarts like former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Although most Shi’ites don’t actually believe al-Mahdi’s
return is imminent, many view the Mahdi’s reappearance
in an allegorical sense of meaning an end to all the
injustices that plagued Shi’ites and Iranians from Husayn’s martyrdom in the 7th century
to present times.
Ahmadinejad has seized
on this narrative to portray his struggle against
corrupt and powerful rivals in terms of a defining
moment in Shi’a Islam. This gives it instant appeal
among his most important constituencies—primarily lower
class and rural Iranians—and makes it more difficult for
members of the Iranian regime to challenge. After all, a
self-proclaimed Islamic Republic shouldn’t oppose
someone deferring to one of Shi’a Islam’s most revered
figures. Indeed, when some regime members, including
clerics, have challenged Ahmadinejad’s worship of
al-Mahdi in the past, his allies have countered by labeling
them "opponents of the Imam of the Era," referring to
al-Mahdi.
Of more concern to
Supreme Leader Khamenei, however, is the ways in which
Ahmadinejad conjures up the image of al-Mahdi’s return
to directly challenge the Islamic Republic and the
Supreme Leader’s rule.
In accordance with the
speeches and writings of Revolutionary leader Grand
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic is
based on the principle of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship
of the Jurist), which holds that a senior Shi’a
jurisprudent (faqih), as a man learned in the teachings
of Islam, is best able to interpret the al-Mahdi’s will
in his absence. As such, this faqih— which in the
Islamic Republic is the Supreme Leader—should act as
al-Mahdi’s deputy in governing the Shi’a faithful.
Implicit in Velayat-e
faqih, however, is the notion that once
al-Mahdi returns there will no longer be a need for the
Supreme Leader to interpret his will, as the Imam can
directly govern his followers. Therefore,Velayat-e faqih will
cease to exist upon the Hidden Imam’s reemergence on
earth.
Ahmadinejad has a
vested interest in seeing the end to the Velayat-e faqih system.
After all, unlike nearly all his predecessors in the
Islamic Republic, with the exception of its first
president following the revolution, Ahmadinejad isn’t a
cleric himself. Thus, the only way the highly ambitious
Ahmadinejad is ever going to reign supreme in Iran is if
he can discredit the Velayat-e faqih system.
Openly calling for the
end to the Velayat-e faqih is
obviously not possible, however, as he would quickly be
imprisoned and possibly executed. Ahmadinejad must
therefore mount a more subtle challenge to the system.
Through the Hidden Imam’s return, Ahmadinejad is again
couching his challenge to the Islamic Republic in the
language of Shi’a Islam itself. This makes it difficult
for Supreme Leader Khamenei and his clerical and layman
allies to root out.
Moreover, given the
continued importance of Shi’a Islam to most Iranians,
and the important role clerics and Islam have played in
all major political and social movements in modern Iran,
Ahmadinejad’s “Mahdism” is an effective tool in trying
to bring the masses to his side. For that reason, it
remains a potent danger to Khamenei and the Iranian
regime.
The irony of course is
that Ahmadinejad is seeking to use Shi’a Islam’s Messiah
figure to usher in an “Iran minus the clergy.”
