“The next Pearl
Harbor we confront could very well be a cyberattack
that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security
systems, our financial systems, our governmental system,” Leon
Panetta, US defence secretary, said at his June
confirmation hearing." The difficulty of creating an
impregnable defence is pushing western governments to work
harder on offense. The US spends 90 per cent of its
cyber spending on defence and only 10 per cent on
deterrence, the opposite of the balance for
traditional arms, said Gen. James Cartwright, vice-chairman
of the joint chiefs of staff. He argues that the ratio
needs to be flipped. The US needs to convince people
that if they attack, “we have the capability and capacity to
do something about it”.
Very interesting story from
today's FT, FYI,
David
October 11, 2011 5:26 pm
US power plants vulnerable to cyberattack
By Joseph Menn in San Francisco
Assault on the
electricity grid could be devastating, writes Joseph Menn
Hundreds
of thousands of people in darkness, hospitals in chaos, a
banking system under siege – a cyberattack on the US
electricity grid could have catastrophic consequences.
When federal researchers
discovered that outside hackers could take control of the
generators used to produce electricity in the US and
destroy them, analysts warned that a co-ordinated assault
on the grid could blackout large regions and cause
devastation akin to scores of hurricanes striking at once.
Regulators asked utilities to fix that design flaw, as
they have with others discovered later.
Now, four years since that first warning, experts say that
power plants – along with financial institutions,
transportation systems and other infrastructure – have
become even more vulnerable.
“The next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a
cyberattack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our
security systems, our financial systems, our governmental
system,” Leon Panetta, US defence secretary, said at his
June confirmation hearing.
The economic damage from a single wave of cyberattacks
on critical infrastructure could exceed $700bn – or the
cumulative toll of 50 major hurricanes ripping into the
nation simultaneously, wrote Stanton Sloane when he was
chief executive of SRA International.
Sceptics argue that the dangers are being talked up by
those eager to be hired to help. Other countries, such as
the UK,
are also exposed, but officials agree that the US is the
most vulnerable to cyberattack because its companies and
people are so dependent on the internet.
Many of the utilities that generate the electricity
essential for preserving food and maintaining social order
could be shut down by even a small team of committed
hackers, researchers say. Attacks on military
communications, banks and telecoms companies could be even
easier, recent espionage cases suggest.
“There are still huge holes in security in energy and
other systems, because they were not designed at the
beginning with security in mind,” said retired Lt. Gen.
Harry Raduege, a former commander of the US military’s
network operations task force who is now with Deloitte.
The utilities say that they have a good record on
reliability and are improving. But a joint security “road
map” issued last month by the US industry and its
regulators conceded that threats are evolving “faster than
the sector’s ability to develop and deploy
countermeasures”. The plan aims to deploy cyber-secure
systems by 2020.
In the US and other countries, the grid is divided up
by regions, which in theory should limit potential damage
to a single region at a time. But a prolonged blackout in
New York,
Washington or other major hubs could still have a
devastating impact – with pronounced food shortages after
a week – and malicious software that works in one region
could also work in others.
Infrastructure defence in the US is complicated by a
patchwork of regulation and ownership and the fact that it
is almost always the private sector – not the government –
that pays for security upgrades. In other countries, such
as China, the government has more control of utilities and
a more direct hand in private commerce.
But the US is also perhaps the best equipped
offensively. It is widely believed to have been behind the
Stuxnet attack last year, which destroyed Iranian nuclear
equipment after spreading virally through holes in
Microsoft and Siemens software.
Many saw Stuxnet as the dawn of a new era in warfare,
the first evidence of the fact that the US, China and
others had both great capabilities and vulnerabilities.
Since that attack, the Stuxnet code has been circulated in
hacking forums. About 85 per cent of the world’s utility
networks have been infiltrated by criminals and spy
agencies in the past year, up from just over 50 per cent
before the discovery of Stuxnet, security company McAfee
and the Center for Strategic and International Studies
found in a survey this year.
But most alarming for the US defence establishment is
the lack of security around the electricity grid. Many
power plants, as well as factory floors and pipelines,
rely on automation equipment that can be reprogrammed
remotely yet do not require even the authentication
imposed on average computer users, said John Pollet of Red
Tiger Security, which has carried out security assessments
on more than 150 facilities: “There is a systemic problem”
across all manufacturers of the gear.
Some control systems can be located with special Google
searches and then ordered to shut down or speed up,
potentially blowing up a power or water treatment plant,
presentations at Black Hat hackers conference showed in
August. Many of these control systems were designed before
the age of widespread internet connections.
The scale of the broader threat has been made clear by
the fact that Chinese hackers have penetrated US agencies
and tech security companies, including antivirus software
company Symantec and other groups that guard federal
networks.
This espionage is not only an enormous threat, but it
also suggests that serious acts of cyberwarfare would be
easy to carry out. “In the cyber realm, the reconnaissance
is operationally the more difficult task,” said Michael
Hayden, former director of the National Security Agency
and the CIA. “Living undetected on a network is far more
difficult than disrupting or destroying it once you are
inside.”
Even when weaknesses in critical equipment are publicly
reported – such as the master password for a Siemens
system that was discovered this summer – a diffuse
regulatory structure makes it difficult for US officials
to do anything about it. The North American Electric
Reliability Corp, an industry regulator, doesn’t have
control over all utility operators and has been reluctant
to adopt stringent safety measures, said Joe Weiss, an
author of a book on threats to the grid.
Those struggling to bolster the nations’ defences are
only too aware that in cyberspace, the attacker always has
the advantage. They only need to find one hole to
infiltrate an entire system, while those seeking to
protect it need to plug all their security gaps – a
seemingly impossible task. That is why cyber ”is an
offense-dominant space”, Robert Butler, just-departed
Pentagon cyber policy chief, told the Financial Times.
The difficulty of creating an impregnable defence is
pushing western governments to work harder on offense. The
US spends 90 per cent of its cyber spending on defence and
only 10 per cent on deterrence, the opposite of the
balance for traditional arms, said Gen. James Cartwright,
vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. He argues that
the ratio needs to be flipped. The US needs to convince
people that if they attack, “we have the capability and
capacity to do something about it”.
Copyright
The Financial Times Limited 2011.
York,
Washington or other major hubs could still have a
devastating impact – with pronounced food shortages after a
week – and malicious software that works in one region could
also work in others.
Infrastructure defence in the US is complicated by a
patchwork of regulation and ownership and the fact that it
is almost always the private sector – not the government –
that pays for security upgrades. In other countries, such as
China,
the government has more control of utilities and a more
direct hand in private commerce.
But the US is also perhaps the best equipped offensively.
It is widely believed to have been behind the Stuxnet attack
last year, which destroyed Iranian nuclear equipment after
spreading virally through holes in Microsoft and Siemens
software.
Many saw Stuxnet as the dawn of a new era in warfare, the
first evidence of the fact that the US, China and others had
both great capabilities and vulnerabilities. Since that
attack, the Stuxnet code has been circulated in hacking
forums. About 85 per cent of the world’s utility networks
have been infiltrated by criminals and spy agencies in the
past year, up from just over 50 per cent before the
discovery of Stuxnet, security company McAfee and the Center
for Strategic and International Studies found in a survey
this year.
But most alarming for the US defence establishment is the
lack of security around the electricity grid. Many power
plants, as well as factory floors and pipelines, rely on
automation equipment that can be reprogrammed remotely yet
do not require even the authentication imposed on average
computer users, said John Pollet of Red Tiger Security,
which has carried out security assessments on more than 150
facilities: “There is a systemic problem” across all
manufacturers of the gear.
Some control systems can be located with special Google
searches and then ordered to shut down or speed up,
potentially blowing up a power or water treatment plant,
presentations at Black Hat hackers conference showed in
August. Many of these control systems were designed before
the age of widespread internet connections.
The scale of the broader threat has been made clear by
the fact that Chinese hackers have penetrated US agencies
and tech security companies, including antivirus software
company Symantec and other groups that guard federal
networks.
This espionage is not only an enormous threat, but it
also suggests that serious acts of cyberwarfare would be
easy to carry out. “In the cyber realm, the reconnaissance
is operationally the more difficult task,” said Michael
Hayden, former director of the National Security Agency and
the CIA. “Living undetected on a network is far more
difficult than disrupting or destroying it once you are
inside.”
Even when weaknesses in critical equipment are publicly
reported – such as the master password for a Siemens system
that was discovered this summer – a diffuse regulatory
structure makes it difficult for US officials to do anything
about it. The North American Electric Reliability Corp, an
industry regulator, doesn’t have control over all utility
operators and has been reluctant to adopt stringent safety
measures, said Joe Weiss, an author of a book on threats to
the grid.
Those struggling to bolster the nations’ defences are
only too aware that in cyberspace, the attacker always has
the advantage. They only need to find one hole to infiltrate
an entire system, while those seeking to protect it need to
plug all their security gaps – a seemingly impossible task.
That is why cyber ”is an offense-dominant space”, Robert
Butler, just-departed Pentagon cyber policy chief,
told the Financial Times.
The difficulty of creating an impregnable defence is
pushing western governments to work harder on offense. The
US spends 90 per cent of its cyber spending on defence and
only 10 per cent on deterrence, the opposite of the balance
for traditional arms, said Gen. James Cartwright,
vice-chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. He argues that
the ratio needs to be flipped. The US needs to convince
people that if they attack, “we have the capability and
capacity to do something about it”.