Bob Anderson (23 Nov 2014)
"The Grand Chessboard2"



This is a complex book. In fact, it reveals a love of complexity by Brzeinski (ZB in subsequent references). He loves the intertwined web of alliances and relationships of government, businesses and organizations, and his theme seems to be, "The more , the better." He's far from being prescient. He does not address the demographic warfare being waged by Islam, nor does he address the demographic disaster transpiring worldwide ... the geriatric world. It must be remembered that he is a CFR intellectual point man.

The book was published in 1998. I do not propose to summarize it here. I've copied some key excerpts regarding the Ukraine, to which he devotes a huge amount of analysis. The fate of the Ukraine is far more significant then we realize. The Ukraine governs the fate of Russia. If the Ukraine becomes a free nation with at least ties to the EU and NATO, Russia will (must) forsake its dreams of former empire and Europeanize. If the Ukraine again becomes the vassal state of Russia, Russia will look eastwards and southwards to rebuild its empire. (He who controls Eurasia controls the world.) 

ZB does not mention the term: New World Order. Nevertheless, in his summary the reader can discern such being formed. (I suggest that the NWO be changed to OWO, One World Order.) The Club of Rome economic zones are clearly recognizable.

David Baye's newsletter states that the Ukraine's gold reserves ... 42 tons worth ... have either vanished or been used up somehow, leaving them little means to wage war. 

The outlook is grim.

THE GRAND CHESSBOARD2
AMERICAN PRIMACY AND ITS GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

ZBIGNIEW 
BRZEZINSKI 

FOR MY STUDENTS - TO HELP THEM SHAPE TOMORROW'S WORLD.

Published 1998

 But the more modern transcon- 
tinental Eurasian bloc lasted very briefly, with the defection by 
Tito's Yugoslavia and the insubordination of Mao's China signaling 
early on the Communist camp's vulnerability to nationalist aspira- 
tions that proved to be stronger than ideological bonds.

In this regard, Ukraine was critical. The growing American incli- 
nation, especially by 1994, to assign a high priority to American- 
Ukrainian relations and to help Ukraine sustain its new national 
freedom was viewed by many in Moscow—even by its "westerniz- 
ers"—as a policy directed at the vital Russian interest in eventu- 
ally bringing Ukraine back into the common fold. That Ukraine will 
eventually somehow be "reintegrated" remains an article of faith 
among many members of the Russian political elite.5 As a result, 
Russia's geopolitical and historical questioning of Ukraine's sepa- 
rate status collided head-on with the American view that an imper- 
ial Russia could not be a democratic Russia. 

Tor example, even Yeltsin's top adviser, Dmitryi Ryurikov, was quoted 
by Interfax (November 20, 1996) as considering Ukraine to be "a temporary 
phenomenon," while Moscow's Obshchaya Gazeta (December 10, 1996) re- 
ported that "in the foreseeable future events in eastern Ukraine may con- 
front Russia with a very difficult problem. Mass manifestations of 
discontent... will be accompanied by appeals to Russia, or even demands, 
to take over the region. Quite a few people in Moscow would be ready to 
support such plans." Western concerns regarding Russian intentions were 
certainly not eased by Russian demands for Crimea and Sevastopol, nor by 
such provocative acts as the deliberate inclusion in late 1996 of Sevastopol 
in Russian public television's nightly weather forecasts lor Russian cities.

The self-definition of Ukrain- 
ian nationhood, during the critical formative stage in the history of 
the new state, was thus diverted from its traditional anti-Polish or 
anti-Romanian orientation and became focused instead on opposi- 
tion to any Russian proposals for a more integrated CIS, for a spe- 
cial Slavic community (with Russia and Belarus), or for a Eurasian 
Union, deciphering them as Russian imperial tactics. 
Ukraine's determination to preserve its independence was en- 
couraged by external support. Although initially the West, espe- 
cially the United States, had been tardy in recognizing the 
geopolitical importance of a separate Ukrainian state, by the mid- 
1990s both America and Germany had become strong backers of 
Kiev's separate identity. In July 1996, the U.S. secretary of defense 
declared, "I cannot overestimate the importance of Ukraine as an 
independent country to the security and stability of all of Europe," 
while in September, the German chancellor—notwithstanding his 
strong support for President Yeltsin—went even further in declar- 
ing that "Ukraine's firm place in Europe can no longer be chal- 
lenged by anyone ... No one will be able any more to dispute 
Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity." American policy 
makers also came to describe the American-Ukrainian relationship 
as "a strategic partnership," deliberately invoking the same phrase 
used to describe the American-Russian relationship. 

Without Ukraine, as already noted, an imperial restoration 
based either on the CIS or on Eurasianism was not a viable option. 
An empire without Ukraine would eventually mean a Russia that 
would become more "Asianized" and more remote from Europe. 
Moreover, Eurasianism was also not especially appealing to the 
newly independent Central Asians, few of whom were eager for a 
new union with Moscow. Uzbekistan became particularly assertive 
in supporting Ukraine's objections to any elevation of the CIS into 
a supranational entity and in opposing the Russian initiatives de- 
signed to enhance the CIS. 
Other CIS states, also wary of Moscow's intentions, tended to 
cluster around Ukraine and Uzbekistan in opposing or evading 
Moscow's pressures for closer political and military integration. 
Moreover, a sense of national consciousness was deepening in al- 
most alt of the new states, a consciousness increasingly focused 
Ukrainian insistence on only limited and largely economic inte- 
on repudiating past submission to Moscow as colonialism and on
gration had the further effect of depriving the notion of a "Slavic 
Union" of any practical meaning. Propagated by some Slavophiles 
and given prominence by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's support, this 
idea automatically became geopolitically meaningless once it was 
repudiated by Ukraine. It left Belarus alone with Russia; and it also 
implied a possible partition of Kazakstan, with its Russian-popu- 
lated northern regions potentially part of such a union. Such an 
option was understandably not reassuring to the new rulers of ' 
Kazakstan and merely intensified the anti-Russian thrust of their 
nationalism, In Belarus, a Slavic Union without Ukraine meant 
nothing less than incorporation into Russia, thereby also igniting 
more volatile feelings of nationalist resentment. 

In early 1996, President Yeltsin replaced his Western-oriented 
foreign minister, Kozyrev, with the more experienced but also or- 
thodox former Communist international specialist Evgenniy Pri- 
makov, whose long-standing interest has been Iran and China. 
Some Russian commentators speculated that Primakov's orienta- 
tion might precipitate an effort to forge a new "antihegemonic" 
coalition, formed around the three powers with the greatest 
geopolitical stake in reducing America's primacy in Eurasia. Some 
of Primakov's initial travel and comments reinforced that impres- 
sion. Moreover, the existing Sino-franian connection in weapons 
forts to increase its access to nuclear energy seemed to provide a 
trade as well as the Russian inclination to cooperate in Iran's ef-
perfect fit for closer political dialogue and eventual alliance. The 
result could, at least theoretically, bring together the world's lead- 
ing Slavic power, the world's most militant Islamic power, and the 
world's most populated and powerful Asian power, thereby creat- 
ing a potent coalition. 

COMMENT: For Russia to look westward to Europe, its only viable
option, the following must be:

Most important in that respect is the need 
for clear and unambiguous acceptance by Russia of Ukraine's sepa- 
rate existence, of its borders, and of its distinctive national identity.
------------------------------------
Most important, however, is Ukraine. As the EU and NATO ex- 
pand, Ukraine will eventually be in the position to choose whether 
it wishes to be part of either organization. It is likely that, in order 
to reinforce its separate status, Ukraine will wish to join both, once 
they border upon it and once its own internal transformation be- 
gins to qualify it for membership. Although that will take time, it is 
not too early for the West—while further enhancing its economic 
and security ties with Kiev—to begin pointing to the decade 
2005-2015 as a reasonable time frame for the initiation of Ukraine's 
progressive inclusion, thereby reducing the risk that the Ukraini- 
ans may fear that Europe's expansion will halt on the Polish- 
Ukrainian border. 

Russia, despite its protestations, is likely to acquiesce in the 
expansion of NATO in 1999 to include several Central European 
countries, because the cultural and social gap between Russia and 
Central Europe has widened so much since the fall of communism. 
By contrast, Russia will find it incomparably harder to acquiesce in 
Ukraine's accession to NATO, for to do so would be to acknowl- 
edge that Ukraine's destiny is no longer organically linked to Rus- 
sia's. Yet if Ukraine is to survive as an independent state, it will 
have to become part of Central Europe rather than Eurasia, and if 
it is to be part of Central Europe, then it will have to partake fully 
of Central Europe's links to NATO and the European Union. Russia's 
to be also truly a part of Europe. Russia's refusal would be tanta- It 
follows that political and economic support for the key newly 
acceptance of these links would then define Russia's own decision
mount to the rejection of Europe in favor of a solitary "Eurasian" 
identity and existence. 

The key point to bear in mind is that Russia cannot be in Eu- 
rope without Ukraine also being in Europe, whereas Ukraine can 
be in Europe without Russia being in Europe. Assuming that Russia 
decides to cast its lot with Europe, it follows that ultimately it is in 
Russia's own interest that Ukraine be included in the expanding 
European structures. Indeed, Ukraine's relationship to Europe 
could be the turning point for Russia itself. But that also means 
that the defining moment for Russia's relationship to Europe is still 
some time off—"defining" in the sense that Ukraine's choice in fa- 
vor of Europe will bring to a head Russia's decision regarding the 
next phase of its history: either to be a part of Europe as well or to 
become a Eurasian outcast, neither truly of Europe nor Asia and 
mired in its "near abroad" conflicts. 

----------------------
COMMENT: The eastward push to the eurasian Balkans

For Ukraine, the central issues are the future character of the 
CIS and freer access to energy sources, which would lessen 
Ukraine's dependence on Russia. In that regard, closer relations 
with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have become im- 
portant to Kiev, with Ukrainian support for the more independent- 
minded states being an extension of Ukraine's efforts to enhance its 
own independence from Moscow. Accordingly, Ukraine has sup- 
ported Georgia's efforts to become the westward route for Azeri oil 
exports. Ukraine has also collaborated with Turkey in order to 
weaken Russian influence in the Black Sea and has supported Turk- 
ish efforts to direct oil flows from Central Asia to Turkish terminals. 

 
independent states is an integral part of a broader strategy for 
Eurasia. The consolidation of a sovereign Ukraine, which in the 
meantime redefines itself as a Central European state and engages 
in closer integration with Central Europe, is a critically important 
component of such a policy, as is the fostering of a closer relation- 
ship with such strategically pivotal states as Azerbaijan and Uzbek- 
istan, in addition to the more generalized effort to open up Central 
Asia (in spite of Russian impediments) to the global economy. 

The benefits of accelerated regional development, funded by 
external investment, would also radiate to the adjoining Russian 
provinces, which tend to be economically underdeveloped. More- 
over, once the region's new ruling elites come to realize that Russia 
acquiesces in the region's integration into the global economy, 
they will become less fearful of the political consequences of close 
economic relations with Russia. In time, a nonimperial Russia 
could thus gain acceptance as the region's preeminent economic 
partner, even though no longer its imperial ruler. 


Miscellaneous note -- Turkey has indeed gone Islam!
Accordingly, America should use its influence in Europe to en- 
courage Turkey's eventual admission to the EU and should make a 
point of treating Turkey as a European state—provided internal 
Turkish politics do not take a dramatic turn in the Islamist direc- 
tion.

In brief, the U.S. policy goal must be unapologetically twofold: 
to perpetuate America's own dominant position for at least a gen- 
eration and preferably longer still; and to create a geopolitical 
framework that can absorb the inevitable shocks and strains of so- 
cial-political change while evolving into the geopolitical core of 
shared responsibility for peaceful global management. A pro- 
longed phase of gradually expanding cooperation with key 
Eurasian partners, both stimulated and arbitrated by America, can 
also help to foster the preconditions for an eventual upgrading of 
the existing and increasingly antiquated UN structures. A new dis- 
tribution of responsibilities and privileges can then take into ac- 
count the changed realities of global power, so drastically different 
from those of 1945. 
These efforts will have the added historical advantage of 
benefiting from the new web of global linkages that is growing 
exponentially outside the more traditional nation-state system. 
That web—woven by multinational corporations, NGOs (non- 
governmental organizations, with many of them transnational in 
character) and scientific communities and reinforced by the In- 
ternet—already creates an informal global system that is inher- 
ently congenial to more institutionalized and inclusive global 
cooperation. 
In the course of the next several decades, a functioning struc- 
ture of global cooperation, based on geopolitical realities, could 
ture of global cooperation, bas
thus emerge and gradually assume the mantle of the world's cur- 
rent "regent," which has for the time being assumed the burden of 
responsibility for world stability and peace. Geostrategic success 
in that cause would represent a fitting legacy of America's role as 
the first, only, and last truly global superpower.