Iran Signals Its Readiness for a Final
Confrontation
Lt.-Col. (ret.)
Michael Segall
- Since the publication of the November 2011 IAEA report,
which explicitly spotlights Iran's plans to build nuclear
weapons, senior figures of the Iranian regime and the
state-run media have begun to use threatening, defiant,
and sometimes contemptuous language toward Israel and the
United States.
- From Iran's standpoint, an ongoing, head-on
confrontation with the U.S. and Israel would serve its
purposes in the region and build its image as a key actor
that stands firm against the West and provides an
alternative agenda to reshape the Middle East. Hence,
compromise has almost ceased to be an option for Iran.
- The current round of the conflict between Iran and the
United States and Israel over Iran's (military) nuclear
program should be seen in a much wider context, one that
centers on shaping a new landscape in the Middle East.
Iran views itself as "the next big thing" in the region
and behaves accordingly-at the moment with no significant
challenge or response from the United States and the West.
- If in the past Iran held clandestine contacts with
Islamic movements, mainly from North African Arab states,
on Sudanese soil (such as Ennadha, which has now
won the Tunisian elections), it can now openly boost its
influence in countries where the "U.S.-supported
dictators" have fallen.
- Iran no longer fears openly acknowledging that it has
built capabilities for reacting to an attack-including the
Palestinian organizations in Gaza and Hizbullah in Lebanon-and depicts them as
part of its defensive strategy and response in case of a
confrontation with Israel and the United States.
- At home, the growing strength of the Revolutionary
Guards enables them to increasingly influence foreign
policy and mainly to export the revolution in ways not
seen in the past. The top commanders of its elite Quds
Force are emerging from the shadows and will have a key
role in the future struggle against the U.S. and its
remaining allies in the region, particularly Israel. Iran,
as its president said, is preparing for the "final
confrontation."
The animated talk in Israel and the West about a possible
attack on Iran's nuclear facilities is naturally arousing
great interest in Iran. Initially, the Iranian leadership
chose not to react and made only minor statements about this
discourse. But since the publication of the November 2011
report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),1
which spotlights the military dimension of Iran's nuclear
program and its plans to build nuclear weapons, senior
figures of the regime and the state-run media have begun to
use threatening, defiant, and sometimes contemptuous
language toward Israel, the United States, and IAEA Chairman
Yukiya Amano, who was described by President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad as "America's
lackey" and as having "no authority of his own."2 Iran's
ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh declared: "This
report is unbalanced, unprofessional, and prepared with
political motivation and under political pressure mostly by
the United States...this is in fact a prime historical
mistake."3 Concurrently, Iranian spokesmen and commentators
emphasize Iran's power, its capability to react "decisively"
(including along Israel's borders), and its ability to
withstand both sanctions and a military offensive.
"The Final Confrontation"
Of all the Iranian statements, one made by
Ahmadinejad stands out. During a meeting with supporters, he
said, "the West is mobilizing all its forces to finish the
job because it is clear as day that NATO is yearning to act
against Iran." He added in an apocalyptic-messianic spirit
that the conditions taking shape in the region are not
normal (a hint at the Imam Mahdi),4 and that "we are nearing
the point of final confrontation." Such a confrontation, he
explained, will not necessarily be military and could take a
political or other form. Ahmadinejad stressed that Iran is
now almost at the apex of its power, but could, if it does
not demonstrate resolve, absorb a blow from which it will
not recover for at least five hundred years. He also warned
that an attack on
Syria by NATO would cause a
regional explosion.5
Iran is not only observing the crisis brought
on by the IAEA report but also the changing Middle East and
its own role in it. On November 4, Iran honored the
anniversary of the 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in
Tehran (right in the midst of the debate on the possibility
of a Western attack). Indeed, Iran views the upheaval in the
Middle East and the growing Islamic trends (with Tunisia as
an example) as further proof of the (divine) justice of its
path. These are added to a series of "glorious"
achievements, as Iran sees it, over the course of more than
a decade-the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, the Second
Intifada, the wars in Afghanistan (the harsh blow to the
Taliban) and
Iraq (the fall of Saddam),
the Second Lebanon War, and Israel's 2009 Gaza operation.
Hubris?
From Iran's standpoint, a head-on confrontation
with the United States and Israel would serve its purposes
in the region and build its image as an actor that stands
firm against the Western powers and does not submit to
pressure. If there still was any chance of Tehran agreeing
to concessions in its sporadic talks with the West about its
nuclear program, the Middle Eastern turmoil has now made a
compromise all but impossible. Indeed, given the harsh IAEA
report, more critical than in the past and providing more
detail on the military aspects of the nuclear program,
compromise has almost ceased to be an option for Iran, which
is deliberately ramping up its defiance in light of Middle
Eastern and world developments.
Tehran is also encouraged by the positions of
Russia and China, which are granting it (along with its
client Syria) immunity against any stringent Security
Council sanctions. Specifically, Iran is encouraged about
its ability to withstand sanctions by Russia's statements
since the IAEA report's publication6 (which have made much
mention of Iran's reaction to the report). So Iran has been
exuding confidence-sometimes verging on hubris-and is
prepared to take risks, even to the point of trying to
assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States and
thereby moving the Middle Eastern playing field to
Washington itself.
An interview that Ahmadinejad gave in early
November to the Egyptian paper Al-Akhbar
accurately reflects Iran's interpretation of recent Middle
Eastern developments and the threats it faces. The United
States, Ahmadinejad asserts, is indeed looking to attack
Iran, as was President Bush, but what a huge difference
there is between Bush's fate and the status Iran enjoys
today.... Iran is becoming a more and more advanced country
and therefore can counterbalance and contend with the global
powers....The Zionist entity and the West, and especially
the United States, fear Iran's power and (growing) role and
so are trying to enlist the world for a battle to contain
and reduce its power and role....They must know that Iran
will not allow such a development.
The Iranian president claims further that the
United States aims to safeguard the "Zionist entity," but
will fail in that endeavor because this entity has no place
in the Middle East and is destined for extinction. If,
Ahmadinejad suggests, the peoples of the region were to hold
a referendum on the Zionist entity's existence among them,
it is clear what the results would be. "This entity can be
compared to a kidney transplanted into a body that has
rejected it...it has no place in the region and the
countries will soon get rid of it and expel it from the
region...it will collapse and its end will be near."7
Iran continues to project military, political,
and economic power in the region, and sees the Israeli and
American focus on possibly attacking it as aimed at
undermining its rising status in the changing Middle
East-and also as manifesting the West's loss of its
traditional mainstays of power in the region. Iranian
propaganda claims that the talk about attacking it is not
serious "because no such option really exists," and that the
real aim of such talk is only to encourage tougher
sanctions-with poor chances of success given Russia and
China's position.
Political and Military Bluff
In an editorial that analyzes the discourse
surrounding an attack on Iran (quoting Ha'aretz, The
Guardian, and President Shimon Peres), Iran's
conservative Mehr news agency assessed that "the Israelis
are trying to set the stage for the imposition of stricter
sanctions on Iran." Mehr observed: "Over the past few days,
Western media outlets have created brouhaha about the
possibility that the Zionist regime may make a unilateral
military strike against Iran." The article noted, "Israel
recently test-fired a ballistic missile, purportedly capable
of reaching Iran," and that "the Israeli military, which is
usually secretive about its activities, allowed media people
to report on the event."
The editorial concludes by saying, "it is clear
that a military attack on Iran cannot be a viable option for
Israel" and offers several reasons for this:
(1) They know that a strike could not stop
Iran's nuclear program.
(2) Even Israeli and U.S. strategists, who
believe that the strike could delay Iran's nuclear program,
say that the strike would only set back Iran's program for
two years, and thus it would not be worth the trouble to
start a war with Iran.
(3) Any attack against Iran would strengthen
Iran's national cohesion.
(4) Iran has shown that it is totally prepared
to counter any military threat and is capable of involving
regional and extra-regional countries in any possible war.
(5) U.S. and Israeli intelligence and military
officials do not believe that Iran's nuclear program is
their number one threat. They know that the Arab Spring is a
much greater threat to their interests.
So, what is the reason behind the new political game
directed at Iran?
It seems that the Israelis are trying to set
the stage for the imposition of stricter sanctions on Iran,
but the biggest obstacle is the fact that Russia, China, and
some members of the European Union are strongly opposed to
new sanctions.
All this rhetoric about war is being used to
compel these countries to stop opposing the moves to impose
new United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iran, which
they prefer to the outbreak of a dangerous war, which could
have serious repercussions for the world.8
In a similar spirit, Esmaeil Kowsari, deputy
chairman of the National Security and Foreign Policy
Committee of the Majlis, asserts that
recent threats made by officials of the U.S.
and the Zionist regime are a political and military bluff.
The Zionist regime and the U.S. are in no position to attack
Iran....The U.S. and the Zionist regime are gripped by an
intense fear and great concern in dealing with developments
in the region and the world. And after losing their
strongholds and illegitimate interests in regional
countries, they are trying to extricate themselves from this
situation.9
Active Diplomacy
Amid the Israeli media campaign about a
possible attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, commentators
in Iran's leading conservative outlets have called on the
country's leaders to adopt an active diplomacy to counter
it. Behind this "murky" campaign, they claim, stands
Israel's fear that Middle Eastern developments have removed
the nuclear issue from the Western agenda and that the tide
is not in Israel's favor. Thus, these commentators contend,
Israel is using a tactic of trying to scare the world and
draw attention to the nuclear issue, hoping thereby to
increase the pressure on Russia and China to support further
Security Council sanctions. This, in these pundits' view, is
primarily psychological warfare by Israel and the West and
does not stem from a real intention to attack Iran.
They argue, then, that Iran needs to take two
clear stances toward the world. First, it should emphasize
that no military attack on its nuclear facilities will
benefit the attackers because these sites are dispersed and
underground. Second, it should declare that if there is an
attack, even if it fails to damage these facilities, it will
be considered an act of aggression and a violation of
international conventions, and therefore Iran will quit the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and no longer be obligated to
the IAEA or allow the presence of nuclear inspectors.
According to the commentators, such a threat would have a
great impact. And to further neutralize the psychological
warfare, Iran should espouse an active diplomacy and convey
its positions to the other states such as Russia and
China.10 Other commentators have suggested putting the
Russian step-by-step initiative on the agenda.11
A Crushing Response
Senior Iranian military officials, clerics, and
commentators have adopted threatening language, warning that
Iran will react with great severity to any attack on it.
- Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei: IRGC and Basij
(volunteer) forces will respond to any aggression with a
strong slap and an iron fist that "the enemies, the U.S.,
its allies, and the Zionist regime, in particular, should
take into consideration, that the Iranian nation is not to
attack any country or nation but rather is to strongly
react to any aggression or threat so that the aggressors
and attackers would collapse from inside....The Iranian
nation will not remain only an observer of the threats of
the absurd materialistic powers....Only a nation with a
stable power of self-defense can survive in a world where,
unfortunately, relations between nations and countries are
based on the power of weapons."12
- Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said any sort of hostile
act against Iran's territorial integrity would be met by a
rapid, firm, and crushing response by its armed forces.13
- Yadallah Javani, politburo chief of the IRGC
(Revolutionary Guards), said that "if the Zionist regime
commits such a mistake [as attacking Iran], it would mean
that it has entered the final days of its existence since
the Islamic Republic of Iran is a powerful and strong
country which can defend its territorial integrity and
interests across the globe, especially in the
Middle-East.... The Islamic Republic of Iran has
some means and possibilities in areas very close to the
Zionist regime and can easily give a response to
Israel to make its leaders repent their action" (emphasis
added).
- Javani also pointed to the Israeli military's successive
failures and defeats in the thirty-three-day war in
Lebanon in summer 2006 and the twenty-two-day offensive in
Gaza in winter 2008-2009, and underlined that Israel is
not strong enough to threaten Iran.14
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Cultural Affairs and Defense
Publicity Brig.-Gen. Massoud Jazayeri said that Iran will
not be handcuffed if comes under enemy aggression.
Israel's Dimona nuclear plant and all other parts of
Israel are within the reach of Iranian missiles. "The
easiest target for Iranian military capabilities is the
(Dimona nuclear) reactor....Our capabilities and our
defensive tactics will definitely make the enemies,
including the U.S. and the Zionists, repent....Tel Aviv
knows well that any small step against Iran will be linked
with the existence of this fake entity...such a military
step from the Zionist entity against Iran will lead to the
total disappearance of this entity from existence...if
smoke columns rise from our nuclear facilities, then this
smoke could rise from other installations and
places....Our military information on our enemies is good
and sufficient."15
- Ayatollah Seyed Ahmad Khatami, a member of the Experts
Assembly, said, "Today Iran is mighty, strong and powerful
and will retaliate against any plot so powerfully that it
would become a lesson for others."16 Another member of the
same assembly, Hossein Ebrahimi, warned
that "before [being able to take] any action against Iran,
the Israelis will feel our wrath in Tel Aviv." Ebrahimi
"assessed Israel's military capabilities during the Second
Lebanon War, ‘and found it weak.'" He stated: "The
Israelis entered the war with the capabilities they had
but earned nothing but humiliation....I do not think that
Israelis along with the Americans and Britons will commit
such a folly....If the threat is carried out, they will
see the political might of the (Islamic) establishment,
the solidarity of the Iranian nation, and the strength of
the country."17 Still another Experts Assembly member,
Mahmud Alavi, said, "Washington and Tel Aviv are aware of
the fact that putting their anti-Iran threats into
practice would cost them dearly, and thus they would not
become involved in such folly." He added "that the United
States and Israel know that such empty threats cannot
intimidate Iran and also know that they would receive a
crushing response if they ever attacked the Islamic
Republic."18
Particularly notable are the tough statements
of Sadollah Zarei of Kayhan newspaper, which
reflects the outlook of the leader of Iran. Zarei claims it
is very unlikely that Israel has any plan to attack Iran or
even to take part in a larger attack; the regional
conditions and Israel's capabilities do not allow it. "Iran
is too great for the Zionist regime to threaten it." Four
regular Iranian missiles, Zarei asserts, will cause a
million Zionists to become refugees, while even if Israel
fires a hundred missiles at Iran not even a few houses will
be demolished. He stresses that Iran's power and
ballistic-missile capability can cause a total Israeli
defeat and adds: "Iranian missile fire on Israel will not
involve any expenditures from the national budget, because
Iran sells missiles in thirty-five countries of the world
and builds its operational missiles from the profits of
these sales. Hence, with very little money it will be
possible to destroy Tel Aviv and the occupied lands." 19
"The Next Big Thing"
To sum up, the current round of the conflict
between Iran and the United States and Israel over Iran's
nuclear program should be seen as another battle in a much
wider campaign, one that centers on shaping a new landscape
in a Middle East that is still in upheaval. Iran views
itself as "the next big thing" in the region and behaves
accordingly-at the moment with no significant response from
the United States and the West. The November 2011 IAEA
report will probably temporarily increase the pressure on
Tehran and lead to limited measures against it. It appears
that ultimately, however, the unhurried approach of the
international system, though it certainly wants to leverage
the IAEA report for "crippling" sanctions (mainly on Iran's
banking and energy sectors) and for another round of talks
with Iran (the Russian proposal?), will again be stymied by
Russia and China, which will act to soften any measures.
Given its assessment of the international and
regional balance of power, Iran's audacity is growing even
in areas distant from the Middle East (as revealed in its
recruitment of a Mexican drug cartel for the assassination
plot against the Saudi ambassador). In the Middle East
itself, Iran's perception is that the dams have burst. If in
the past it held clandestine contacts with Islamic movements
on Sudanese soil (such as Ennadha, which has now
won the Tunisian elections), it can now openly boost its
influence in countries where the "U.S.-supported dictators"
have fallen. Iran no longer fears openly acknowledging that
it has built capabilities for reacting to an
attack-including the Palestinian organizations in Gaza and
Hizbullah in Lebanon-and depicts them as part of its
defensive strategy and response in case of a confrontation
with Israel and the United States.
Standing up to the United States and Israel on
the nuclear issue well serves Iranian interests in the Arab
street, which was and remains hostile toward those two
countries. As Islam regains its hold over the Middle East,
after years in which it was repressed by the Arab regimes,
Iran's confidence grows that it can determine the new power
equations in the region and drive the United States out of
it-as well as Israel.
At home, the growing strength of the
Revolutionary Guards-who play a central role with respect to
both domestic politics and the Iranian nuclear program, its
protection, survivability, and the missiles that are
eventually supposed to carry nuclear warheads-enables them
to increasingly influence foreign policy and to export the
revolution more boldly and in ways not seen in the past.
Indeed, recently Kayhan made an extraordinary
admission that testifies to Iran's self-confidence perhaps
more than anything else. It stated that the Quds Force of
the Revolutionary Guards has already been clashing for some
time with U.S. forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere:
The Quds Force is more than an active
operational force; it is an ideology that does not
recognize borders, a worldview whose tenets and
beliefs directly conflict with Western culture....Since
conquering Iraq and Afghanistan and entering the region, the
United States has experienced more than ever the taste of
conflict with the Quds Force as profoundly and tangibly as
possible. America's appreciation of Iran's regional power is
based mainly, and perhaps exclusively, on the experience of
clashing with the Quds Force (emphasis added).20
Asr-e Iran also writes openly about
the Quds Force's active presence in Iraq, and its
contribution to bolstering Iran's status, to the detriment
of
Saudi Arabia.21
In light of the Quds Force's involvement in
planning the putative hit on the Saudi ambassador in
Washington, there have been American suggestions to
assassinate senior Quds Force figures including its
commander, Kassem Suleimani. This has sparked a
wave of adulation for the force and its leaders in the
Iranian media; they are seen as playing, and as destined to
play, a key role in the struggle against the United States
and Israel. Suleimani's name was also recently
mentioned as a candidate for the next president of Iran (in
2013). The previous commander of the Quds Force, Ahmad
Vahidi, is now defense minister. Iran indeed views itself as
prepared for a final confrontation.
* * *
Notes
1.
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf.
2.
http://tehrantimes.com/index.php/politics/4346-iran-will-make-us-regret-its-opposition-ahmadinejad-.
3. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/209099.html.
4. Part of the revolutionary leadership
believes that the imminent return of the Twelfth Iman-as the
Mahdi-can and should be accelerated by triggering global
chaos. See Dore Gold, "The Diplomatic Implications of the
Growing Iranian Threat," in
Iran's Race for Regional
Supremacy: Strategic Implications for the Middle East
(
Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center
for Public Affairs, 2008), p. 20.
5.
http://www.fararu.com/vdceex8o.jh8eni9bbj.html.
8.
http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=1454640.
9.
http://tehrantimes.com/index.php/politics/4288-mp-dismisses-israel-threats-as-political-bluff.
12.
http://www.irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30656629&SRCH=1
13.
http://www.javanonline.ir/vdcdks0ozyt0kn6.2a2y.html.
14.
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13900817000865.
15.
http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=277456
16.
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007272486.
17.
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007272258.
18. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/208798.html.
19.
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13900814001095.
20. http://www.kayhannews.ir/900814/2.htm.
* * *
IDF Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael (Mickey) Segall, an
expert on strategic issues with a focus on Iran, terrorism,
and the Middle East, is a senior analyst at the Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs