Seldom in the annals of tinsel diplomacy has a show garnered
such devastating reviews long before its opening curtain.
Dismissed and derided from every quarter, laughed off as a
lukewarm sham, the Annapolis peace summit has confounded many Middle East
analysts merely by the prospect of its actually taking place.
It may be a ludicrous what-if to even contemplate the notion,
but if the Annapolis summit actually amounts to more than a passing footnote
in the history of this region, at least we'll know some of the reasons why:
1. The settlers expect it to fail.
The settlers, the canaries in the coal mine of the Israeli
right, have not taken Annapolis seriously. They have waved it away as a
desperate attempt by Olmert to divert attention from the myriad graft
investigations which threaten him.
They ought to know better by now.
The settlers made precisely the same statements when Ariel
Sharon first announced his plan for removing settlers and settlements from
the Gaza Strip. At the outset, the right as a whole failed to take Sharon
seriously. This allowed the then-prime minister the opportunity to build
crucial momentum for one of the most radical operations in Israel's long
history of unlikely missions.
By the time the right mounted its dramatic, monumental
counterattack, it was too late.
Now as then, the right is asleep at the switch. The fact that
Avigdor Lieberman of Yisrael Beiteinu and Shas' Eli Yishai still occupy
chairs at Olmert's cabinet table is but one of the indications. Had they
taken Annapolis seriously, they would have brought down the government long
ago.
The right, spearheaded by the settlers, remains Israel's most
potent force for scuttling government initiatives. They have been lulled into
inaction, however, by their conviction that a post-disengagement Gaza of
Qassams and Hamas rule has turned the Israeli public tide against all
prospect of land-for-peace formulas. For their own sake, they might consider
that one Sadat-like gesture on the part of Israel's enemies could send tens
of thousands of settlers to new homes closer to the Green Line.
2. Hamas expects it to fail.
If Hamas had truly taken Annapolis seriously, it would have
seen to it that the conference would not have taken place at all. Not only
through violence, but through a high-power pressure campaign to persuade the
Palestinian public that Annapolis is a betrayal of Palestinian interests.
As it stands, if Palestinians succeed in carrying out a
terrorist attack during the summit, this will further cement Hamas'
international pariah status as a sponsor and contractor of terror.
3. Ehud Barak expects it to fail.
Here is a man whose diplomatic instincts have proven as
consistently ill-fated as his political ones. His inability to read other
people - and other peoples, such as the Palestinians - is a true disability.
Alternate version: Benjamin Netanyahu and Yossi Beilin have
both suggested that going to Annapolis was a mistake.
4. All experts expect it to fail.
When Middle East experts all seem to agree, let the reader
beware.
For months this, there was across-the-board agreement that a
war would break out this summer. It became something of a given that a war
was inevitable, so much so that the only debates swirled around when it would
begin, how long would it last, if Tel Aviv would be within rocket range, and
who would join forces against Israel. Thank God for just that sort of human
error.
5. The intifada was a failure.
The ideological sea change of the Second Intifada was the
creation of a kamikaze messianism among many young Palestinian hardliners,
who came to believe that a one-state solution was imminent, and that the
single state would be a Islamist-oriented Palestine.
More than seven years on, however, the Palestinian national
movement is a rudderless ship, taking on water. Hamas, which surprised itself
with an election victory, has been unable to demonstrate decisive leadership,
and is blamed by many for excesses of power, the most troubling of which was
its brief civil war with Fatah.
The time that had always seemed to be on the Palestinians'
side, is now fast running out. If Palestinians fail to act soon to take
advantage of proposals like the Arab peace initiative, the one-state solution
may turn out to be a sovereign Israel and no sovereign Palestine.
If, however, Fatah and Hamas can act with wisdom, the neglect
that Annapolis symbolizes may be leveraged into a new momentum for statehood,
and a search for creative solutions to agonizing problems.
6. The disengagement from Gaza was a failure.
It is not a stretch to suggest that most Israeli parents of
army-age children and most families of IDF reservists are grateful that
Israel pulled out of Gaza. Hence the original popularity of the disengagement
concept.
But a central failure of the disengagement lay in its attempt
to solve Israel's demographic problem without engaging the Palestinians. The
unilateral nature of the plan, executed without a peace agreement with the
Palestinians, granted a tacit victory to Hamas and, in subsequent Qassam
attacks, undermined the entire land-for-peace concept.
Any further attempts to effectively and safely separate
Israelis and Palestinians into two states will need to be made in the context
of direct negotiations, backed by international guarantors and the support of
the two peoples involved.
7. No one really likes Iran
Even Iran's allies can't bring themselves to fully trust the
Islamic Republic. In the Muslim world, the bad blood between Iran and a host
of brother states is oceanic in scale.
One of the best ways to fight Iran, would be to move toward
solutions to Israel's remaining states of war with its neighbors, the
Palestinians, the Lebanese, and the Syrians. A solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be a step toward isolating Iran, the
premier outside agitator in the long war over the Holy Land.
The Saudis know this, the Gulf states know this, and if they
can bring themselves to put their spiritual and material influence to open
and good use, peace might just stand a chance.
8. Syria is not convinced Annapolis will fail.
Damascus' decision to take part in the conference surprised a
number of experienced Syria hands. Syrian declarations during the conference
bear close study, as to the possibility that the Assad government received
something from Washington in return for their attendance.
9. George Bush is desperate
If time is slipping away for the Palestinians, Bush's meter
is running much faster. If his legacy is to be anything other than failure in
Iraq and failure in Katrina, he will need to score a foreign policy coup - if
not a finished achievement, then at least a change in direction that may
reach fruition in the next administration.
Bush's speech at Annapolis may therefore be the key to the
perceived success or failure of the conference. Should he break new ground -
for example, if he becomes the first American president to openly declare
support for a divided Jerusalem as the capitals of both Israel and an
independent Palestine - he will be staking a claim to a quite different place
in history. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/928139.html
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