Middle East Crisis: Backgrounder
July 13, 2006 20 27 GMT

Israel lives with three realities: geographic, demographic and cultural.
Geographically, it is at a permanent disadvantage, lacking strategic
depth. It does enjoy the advantage of interior lines -- the ability to
move forces rapidly from one front to another. Demographically, it is on
the whole outnumbered, although it can achieve local superiority in
numbers by choosing the time and place of war. Its greatest advantage is
cultural. It has a far greater mastery of the technology and culture of
war than its neighbors.

Two of the realities cannot be changed. Nothing can be done about
geography or demography. Culture can be changed. It is not inherently
the case that Israel will have a technological or operational advantage
over its neighbors. The great inherent fear of Israel is that the Arabs
will equal or surpass Israeli prowess culturally and therefore
militarily. If that were to happen, then all three realities would turn
against Israel and Israel might well be at risk.

That is why the capture of Israeli troops, first one in the south, then
two in the north, has galvanized Israel. The kidnappings represent a
level of Arab tactical prowess that previously was the Israeli domain.
They also represent a level of tactical slackness on the Israeli side
that was previously the Arab domain. These events hardly represent a
fundamental shift in the balance of power. Nevertheless, for a country
that depends on its cultural superiority, any tremor in this variable
reverberates dramatically. Hamas and Hezbollah have struck the core
Israeli nerve. Israel cannot ignore it.

Embedded in Israel's demographic problem is this: Israel has national
security requirements that outstrip its manpower base. It can field a
sufficient army, but its industrial base cannot supply all of the
weapons needed to fight high-intensity conflicts. This means it is
always dependent on an outside source for its industrial base and must
align its policies with that source. At first this was the Soviets, then
France and finally the United States. Israel broke with the Soviets and
France when their political demands became too intense. It was after
1967 that it entered into a patron-client relationship with the United
States. This relationship is its strength and its weakness. It gives the
Israelis the systems they need for national security, but since U.S. and
Israeli interests diverge, the relationship constrains Israel's range of
action.

During the Cold War, the United States relied on Israel for a critical
geopolitical function. The fundamental U.S. interest was Turkey, which
controlled the Bosporus and kept the Soviet fleet under control in the
Mediterranean. The emergence of Soviet influence in Syria and Iraq --
which was not driven by U.S. support for Israel since the United States
did not provide all that much support compared to France -- threatened
Turkey with attack from two directions, north and south. Turkey could
not survive this. Israel drew Syrian attention away from Turkey by
threatening Damascus and drawing forces and Soviet equipment away from
the Turkish frontier. Israel helped secure Turkey and turned a Soviet
investment into a dry hole.

Once Egypt signed a treaty with Israel and Sinai became a buffer zone,
Israel became safe from a full peripheral war -- everyone attacking at
the same time. Jordan was not going to launch an attack and Syria by
itself could not strike. The danger to Israel became Palestinian
operations inside of Israel and the occupied territories and the threat
posed from Lebanon by the Syrian-sponsored group Hezbollah.

In 1982, Israel responded to this threat by invading Lebanon. It moved
as far north as Beirut and the mountains east and northeast of it.
Israel did not invade Beirut proper, since Israeli forces do not like
urban warfare as it imposes too high a rate of attrition. But what the
Israelis found was low-rate attrition. Throughout their occupation of
Lebanon, they were constantly experiencing guerrilla attacks,
particularly from Hezbollah.

Hezbollah has two patrons: Syria and Iran. The Syrians have used
Hezbollah to pursue their political and business interests in Lebanon.
Iran has used Hezbollah for business and ideological reasons. Business
interests were the overlapping element. In the interest of business, it
became important to Hezbollah, Syria and Iran that an accommodation be
reached with Israel. Israel wanted to withdraw from Lebanon in order to
end the constant low-level combat and losses.

Israel withdrew in 1988, having reached quiet understandings with Syria
that Damascus would take responsibility for Hezbollah, in return for
which Israel would not object to Syrian domination of Lebanon. Iran,
deep in its war with Iraq, was not in a position to object if it had
wanted to. Israel returned to its borders in the north, maintaining a
security presence in the south of Lebanon that lasted for several years.

As Lebanon blossomed and Syria's hold on it loosened, Iran also began to
increase its regional influence. Its hold on some elements of Hezbollah
strengthened, and in recent months, Hezbollah -- aligning itself with
Iranian Shiite ideology -- has become more aggressive. Iranian weapons
were provided to Hezbollah, and tensions grew along the frontier. This
culminated in the capture of two soldiers in the north and the current
crisis.

It is difficult to overestimate the impact of the soldier kidnappings on
the Israeli psyche. First, while the Israeli military is extremely
highly trained, Israel is also a country with mass conscription. Having
a soldier kidnapped by Arabs hits every family in the country. The older
generation is shocked and outraged that members of the younger
generation have been captured and worried that they allowed themselves
to be captured; therefore, the younger generation needs to prove it too
can defeat the Arabs. This is not a primary driver, but it is a dimension.

The more fundamental issue is this: Israel withdrew from Lebanon in
order to escape low-intensity conflict. If Hezbollah is now going to
impose low-intensity conflict on Israel's border, the rationale for
withdrawal disappears. It is better for Israel to fight deep in Lebanon
than inside Israel. If the rockets are going to fall in Israel proper,
then moving into a forward posture has no cost to Israel.

 From an international standpoint, the Israelis expect to be condemned.
These international condemnations, however, are now having the opposite
effect of what is intended. The Israeli view is that they will be
condemned regardless of what they do. The differential between the
condemnation of reprisal attacks and condemnation of a full invasion is
not enough to deter more extreme action. If Israel is going to be
attacked anyway, it might as well achieve its goals.

Moreover, an invasion of Hezbollah-held territory aligns Israel with the
United States. U.S. intelligence has been extremely concerned about the
growing activity of Hezbollah, and U.S. relations with Iran are not
good. Lebanon is the center of gravity of Hezbollah, and the destruction
of Hezbollah capabilities in Lebanon, particularly the command
structure, would cripple Hezbollah operations globally in the near
future. The United States would very much like to see that happen, but
cannot do it itself. Moreover, an Israeli action would enrage the
Islamic world, but it would also drive home the limits of Iranian power.
Once again, Iran would have dropped Lebanon in the grease, and not been
hurt itself. The lesson of Hezbollah would not be lost on the Iraqi Shia
-- or so the Bush administration would hope.

Therefore, this is one Israeli action that benefits the United States,
and thus helps the immediate situation as well as long-term geopolitical
alignments. It realigns the United States and Israel. This also argues
that any invasion must be devastating to Hezbollah. It must go deep. It
must occupy temporarily. It must shatter Hezbollah.

At this point, the Israelis appear to be unrolling a war plan in this
direction. They have blockaded the Lebanese coast. Israeli aircraft are
attacking what air power there is in Lebanon, and have attacked
Hezbollah and other key command-and-control infrastructure. It would
follow that the Israelis will now concentrate on destroying Hezbollah --
and Lebanese -- communications capabilities and attacking munitions
dumps, vehicle sites, rocket-storage areas and so forth.

Most important, Israel is calling up its reserves. This is never a
symbolic gesture in Israel. All Israelis below middle age are in the
reserves and mobilization is costly in every sense of the word. If the
Israelis were planning a routine reprisal, they would not be mobilizing.
But they are, which means they are planning to do substantially more
than retributive airstrikes. The question is what their plan is.

Given the blockade and what appears to be the shape of the airstrikes,
it seems to us at the moment the Israelis are planning to go fairly deep
into Lebanon. The logical first step is a move to the Litani River in
southern Lebanon. But given the missile attacks on Haifa, they will go
farther, not only to attack launcher sites, but to get rid of weapons
caches. This means a move deep into the Bekaa Valley, the seat of
Hezbollah power and the location of plants and facilities. Such a
penetration would leave Israeli forces' left flank open, so a move into
Bekaa would likely be accompanied by attacks to the west. It would bring
the Israelis close to Beirut again.

This leaves Israel's right flank exposed, and that exposure is to Syria.
The Israeli doctrine is that leaving Syrian airpower intact while
operating in Lebanon is dangerous. Therefore, Israel must at least be
considering using its air force to attack Syrian facilities, unless it
gets ironclad assurances the Syrians will not intervene in any way.
Conversations are going on between Egypt and Syria, and we suspect this
is the subject. But Israel would not necessarily object to the
opportunity of eliminating Syrian air power as part of its operation, or
if Syria chooses, going even further.

At the same time, Israel does not intend to get bogged down in Lebanon
again. It will want to go in, wreak havoc, withdraw. That means it will
go deeper and faster, and be more devastating, than if it were planning
a long-term occupation. It will go in to liquidate Hezbollah and then
leave. True, this is no final solution, but for the Israelis, there are
no final solutions.

Israeli forces are already in Lebanon. Its special forces are inside
identifying targets for airstrikes. We expect numerous air attacks over
the next 48 hours, as well as reports of firefights in southern Lebanon.
We also expect more rocket attacks on Israel.

It will take several days to mount a full invasion of Lebanon. We would
not expect major operations before the weekend at the earliest. If the
rocket attacks are taking place, however, Israel might send several
brigades to the Litani River almost immediately in order to move the
rockets out of range of Haifa. Therefore, we would expect a rapid
operation in the next 24-48 hours followed by a larger force later.

At this point, the only thing that can prevent this would be a major
intervention by Syria with real guarantees that it would restrain
Hezbollah and indications such operations are under way. Syria is the
key to a peaceful resolution. Syria must calculate the relative risks,
and we expect them to be unwilling to act decisively.

Therefore:

1. Israel cannot tolerate an insurgency on its northern frontier; if
there is one, it wants it farther north.

2. It cannot tolerate attacks on Haifa.

3. It cannot endure a crisis of confidence in its military
4. Hezbollah cannot back off of its engagement with Israel.

5. Syria can stop this, but the cost to it stopping it is higher than
the cost of letting it go on.

It would appear Israel will invade Lebanon. The global response will be
noisy. There will be no substantial international action against Israel.
Beirut's tourism and transportation industry, as well as its financial
sectors, are very much at risk.