"... urgent need to revise some of its outdated
concepts and apply a fresh approach to the new
realities - even at the cost of standing up to
civilian government."
 
 

www.thebarrychamishwebsite.com
www.barrychamish.com

THE SHALIT KIDNAPPING by Barry Chamish

For twelve years I've been shouting and screaming that
Israel's "leadership" utterly controlled by the
Council On Foreign Relations, known broadly as "the
neo-cons", would contrive a war which they would lose.
For that my reputation has been slammed with rumors
about my sanity, sobriety and common sense. When that
didn't do the trick, a common car "accident" was
supposed to take care of me. Every effort was made to
shut me up. And you know what, I think that finally
"they" did it. Who needs the crap while my nation
dissolves before our eyes?

Here is the Debka Report from July 11. To those who
asked, here is how the New World Order proxy, Israel,
started its war with the cooperation of the NWO enemy
Iran. It sure beats Americans and Iranians dying. So
for this, innocents in Israel and Lebanon are doing
the suffering and the dying:

DEBKA:

Maj.-Gen (Ret) Giora Eiland traced the breakdown which
allowed a Hamas-led squad overrun an Israeli army post
on the Israeli side of the southern Gaza border, kill
two soldiers and snatch Corporal Gideon Shalit on June
25, to an "operational" breakdown. He did not lay it
at the door of commanders and their conduct.

"None of them lied or failed to perform their duties,"
said Gen. Eiland, former national security adviser, in
the report on the inquiry the chief of staff entrusted
him to carry into the causes of the incident at the
Kerem Shalom post.

Most damningly, Eilat affirmed that the corporal's
abduction could have been aborted. The kidnappers and
their hostage were clearly visible on the unit's
electronic screens as they crossed the border into the
Gaza Strip, but the tank commander delayed by first
asking his superior for permission to open fire and
abort their flight.

The only action Chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz
took on receipt of the report Monday, July 10, was to
announce he had raised the matter in conversation with
a number of commanders. Halutz made no mention of how
he would handle Eiland's comprehensive denigration of
an "operational breakdown - from battalion and brigade
level all the way up to the top of the division and
general staff. "

Neither was this finding itemized. Eiland himself did
not recommend dismissals. His restraint was no doubt
motivated by the general disinclination to give the
enemy free points at a time when the IDF is engaged in
combat in the Gaza Strip, especially when the
commanders targeted for criticism are at the front
line.

According to *DEBKA/file/*'s military sources, the two
generals are counting on the Gaza operation, which the
IDF launched on June 28, three days after the Hamas
assault on the army post, stealing the limelight from
the faults found along the entire chain of command.
Our sources say that Eiland directs most of his
disapproval at three to five officers from the ranks
of colonel, brigadier general, major general and
lieutenant general.

At the same time, General Eiland omitted to asked the
three searching questions that might have laid bare
the root-causes of the fiasco at Kerem Shalom:

1. Was this a one-time slip-up or a part of a
long-running string of lapses?

2. Was it the natural, preordained consequence of the
operational directives coming down from the prime
minister, the defense minister via IDF chiefs?

On June 23, two days before the attack and kidnap,
*DEBKA/file/* exposed the five taboos prime minister
Ehud Olmert and defense minister Amir Peretz laid down
for military operations to counter the Qassam missile
blitz against southern Israel.

One banned Israeli forays into the areas of the
missile sites in Gaza and ambushes on Palestinian side
of the border fence.

Eiland refrained from asking whether those strict
prohibitions may not have handicapped the command
levels of the army to the point of rendering them
incapable of performing their duties. They officers
had due warning of an impending Palestinian
cross-border attack through an undiscovered tunnel.
What more logical than to put IDF ambushes squads
behind enemy lines to trap the assailants when they
return to their base in Gaza? Knowing they might be
there, the Hamas-led kidnap team would have realized
its escape route with Shalit was blocked and might
have been deterred from the abduction.

3. The Eiland probe should have examined the strategic
concepts guiding Israel's top commanders before and
after the fall of the Kerem Shalom post.

Given the far-reaching consequences, the Israeli
public is entitled to a lot more enlightenment.

The tailored facts released show a prime minister and
defense minister still in a state of denial over the
root-causes of the present security crisis. Israel's
unconsidered disengagement from the Gaza Strip and its
military withdrawal from the Philadelpi border route
in September 2005 constitute Israel's most damaging
military and political blunder in a decade. Until this
is confronted and objectively analyzed, the top IDF
brass will be constrained from looking squarely at the
escalating terror threat posed by Hamas-in-government
and addressing it with all the considerable
professionalism at their command.

Such cool analysis is the target of Olmert's primary
taboo. With the premiership, he inherited from Ariel
Sharon the deadly fallout from this bungle, along with
the leadership of the Kadima party, whose only raison
d'etre after rubber-stamping Sharon's disengagement
from Gaza is to continue the process on the West Bank.

The scales have fallen from many Israeli eyes in the
wake of the Gilead Shalit disaster. People have begun
asking hard questions, such as how did Hamas come to
take over Palestinian government in the first place.
And why is Hamas being permitted to terrorize southern
Israeli with Qassam missiles after the Gaza Strip was
handed over lock, stock and barrel to full Palestinian
control. And the missile menace is beginning to
percolate into the West Bank too.

Even some of Kadima's leading figures appear
perplexed.

In his report to the chief of staff, Giora Eiland
implied that the IDF may be in urgent need to revise
some of its outdated concepts and apply a fresh
approach to the new realities - even at the cost of
standing up to civilian government. Unless this is
broached, Israel's armed forces are in for more
command failures and further misfortunes.

**
To book me for North American speaking dates or
interviews only,
write chamishba@gmail.com
 
 

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